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Abstract Amidst long-running debates within the field, High Energy Physics
(HEP) has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard
frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval esti-
mation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The recent
discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical
methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice
in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be understood as
pragmatic, in the sense that statistical methods are chosen for their suitabil-
ity for the practical demands of experimental HEP, rather than reflecting a
commitment to a particular epistemic framework. In particular, I argue that
understanding the statistical methodology of HEP through the perspective of
pragmatism clarifies the role of and rationale for significance testing in the
search for new phenomena such as the Higgs boson.
1 Introduction
On July 4, 2012 the CMS and ATLAS collaborations announced their latest
findings from the search for the Higgs boson. ATLAS spokesperson Fabiola
Gianotti declared that they had observed “clear signs of a new particle, at
the level of 5 sigma, in the mass region around 126 GeV” (ATLAS 2012).
The CMS statement reported the observation of an “excess of events at a
mass of approximately 125 GeV with a statistical significance of five standard
deviations above background expectations . . . . We interpret this to be due
to the production of a previously unobserved particle with a mass of around
125 GeV” (CMS 2012). CMS and ATLAS considered the evidence insufficient
to declare that the new particle was the Higgs boson itself, but only stated
that the evidence was consistent with the expectations from decays of a Higgs
boson.
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Press coverage emphasized the appeal in these declarations to a standard
of discovery: In order to announce the discovery of a new particle, the physi-
cists needed to show that they had found an excess of candidate events beyond
the expectations from background alone that would constitute a departure of
at least five standard deviations (“5σ”). The associated probability statement
(p-value) was reported variously. The New York Times reported that “Both
groups said that the likelihood that their signal was a result of a chance fluc-
tuation was less than one chance in 3.5 million, ‘five sigma,’ which is the gold
standard in physics for a discovery” (Overbye 2012). Reuters noted that “Five
sigma, a measure of probability reflecting a less than one in a million chance
of a fluke in the data, is a widely accepted standard for scientists to agree the
particle exists” (Wickham & Evans 2012).
Meanwhile, in discussions on the website of the International Society for
Bayesian Analysis, statisticians debated the statistical methodology employed
in the Higgs discovery. Tony O’Hagan, prompted by “[a] question from Dennis
Lindley,” posted a series of queries about the Higgs search results, referring
to the 5σ requirement as “extreme” and asking for its justification. O’Hagan
stated, “Rather than ad hoc justification of a p-value, it is of course better to
do a proper Bayesian analysis. Are the particle physics community completely
wedded to frequentist analysis?” and asked, “If so, has anyone tried to explain
what bad science that is?” (O’Hagan 2012)1
These questions put into play two distinct issues regarding the statistical
methodology of HEP. One is HEP’s reliance on the 5σ standard for discovery
claims. The other is the use of the methodology of significance testing. In
this paper, I will focus on the question of the warrant for HEP’s reliance on
significance testing, though this will lead naturally to consideration of the 5σ
standard. The second of O’Hagan’s questions explicitly assumes that “it is
better to do a proper Bayesian analysis.” Were this the case, then the use of
significance testing in HEP would indeed be puzzling, and one would want
to investigate the reasons for the persistent failure of presumably well-trained
and mathematically competent scientists to take advantage of the availability
of a better method of analysis than that which they use. I will argue that
O’Hagan’s presupposition is incorrect: the use of significance testing in such
contexts as the Higgs search is well-warranted, and a Bayesian analysis is not
“of course better.” Understanding why requires consideration of the specific
and limited purpose for which significance testing was used in the Higgs search.
My intention in this paper is not, however, to trudge along the well-worn
paths of the debates between frequentists and Bayesians (though my course
might intersect these at some points).2 Rather, I will ask what warrants the
application of significance testing to the specific tasks for which HEP employs
such tests?
1 O’Hagan collected and summarized the many replies he received to his post. In this digest, he noted
that he had intentionally used somewhat inflammatory language to “provoke discussion”
(O’Hagan 2012).
2 For a well-informed guided tour of those paths, with some novel insights, see (Sprenger 2016) who
cites the Higgs case as motivation for a careful consideration of the issues.
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I argue that the use of significance testing by scientists pursuing the dis-
covery of the Higgs boson is warranted because of its strategic value in (1)
enabling physicists to determine whether their data are, in a relevant way,
statistically discrepant from the hypothesis asserting that the decay of Higgs
bosons does not contribute to their data, and (2) doing so in a way that
enables them to present a cogent argument appropriate to their anticipated
audience. Moreover, I argue that their reliance on the 5σ standard for discov-
ery is warranted by their consideration of both the negative consequences of
an erroneous discovery claim and the value for the further pursuit of inquiry
of a correct discovery claim. These warrants are independent of philosophical
commitments regarding the meaning or ontology of probability statements, or
the relationship between probability and belief. In this way, I show the war-
rant for the use of significance testing in HEP to be pragmatic insofar as it is
grounded in the practical demands of scientific discovery and argumentation.
I begin my argument in §2 with a quick summary of the argument given
by the ATLAS collaboration in their paper announcing the discovery of a new
boson with Higgs-like properties, highlighting the role of their appeal to signif-
icance testing. §3 explains the pragmatic warrant for HEP’s use of significance
testing. In §4 I offer some brief comments on the 5σ standard in light of the ar-
gument previously given. §5 takes up an objection and emphasizes the priority
of argumentative tasks over statistical methodology. The paper’s conclusions
are summarized in §6.
2 Significance testing in HEP: the case of the Higgs
By characterizing their evidence in terms of an estimate of the statistical
significance of their findings, ATLAS and CMS adopted the language and
methodology of significance testing, a statistical methodology for testing hy-
potheses that relies only on probabilities understood as relative frequencies. I
will begin with a rough summary of the argument used by ATLAS (the rea-
soning in the paper submitted by CMS is similar) in order to highlight the role
played by appeals to significance testing in ATLAS’s experimental argument.
Understanding this role is, I claim, essential for understanding the pragmatic
warrant for using significance testing.
ATLAS bases its discovery claim on two distinct periods of data-collection.
The 2011 dataset was collected with the LHC operating at a center-of-mass
energy of
√
s = 7 TeV, while the 2012 dataset came from a
√
s = 8 TeV
run. Both ATLAS and CMS had already found excesses (Aad et al. 2012a;
Chatrchyan et al. 2012a) beyond background expectations in the 2011 data
“compatible with SM Higgs boson production and decay in the mass region
124–126 GeV, with significances of 2.9 and 3.1 standard deviations, respec-
tively” (Aad et al. 2012b, 1).
Crucial to the argumentative strategy of the ATLAS paper is the identi-
fication of distinctive decay modes of the Higgs boson that lead to distinct
search strategies. A Standard Model (SM) Higgs boson has a number of dis-
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tinct decay modes: γγ, WW , ZZ, ττ , bb, Zγ, and µµ, among others. ATLAS’s
discovery claim rests on data from the first three. Data are selected accord-
ing to criteria (cuts) tailored to the expected features of particles decaying in
these modes. The number of such candidate events is compared to the number
of events expected to satisfy the cuts that result from background – i.e., from
processes involving already established physics. An excess number of candi-
date events beyond what is expected from background might be evidence of
the existence of a new boson such as the Higgs, or it might be the result of an
upward fluctuation in the rate of background processes.
The statistical significance calculation contributes to a judgment of the
plausibility of the latter scenario by determining the probability of getting
an excess as large or larger than that observed, under the supposition that
only background processes are involved. That probability is the p-value of the
observed excess.
The three decay modes from which the evidence is drawn add evidential
weight to the statistical significance argument insofar as they help to fix the
theoretical interpretation of the excess indicated: the excesses show up in mul-
tiple channels in a manner that is predictable in light of knowledge about the
rates at which the Higgs should decay in those channels and the size of the
backgrounds in each of them.
The guidance of theory is important to the validation of ATLAS’s evi-
dence claim in another way. ATLAS relies on statistical models of both the
background and the signal for a SM Higgs boson. Neither of these statisti-
cal models can be calculated directly from theory. Both require the use of
simulation (Massimi & Bhimji 2015; Morrison 2015). For the signal, this simu-
lation does depend, however, on a theoretical characterization of the processes
by which Higgs bosons are produced (see, e.g., Harlander & Kilgore 2002).
Understanding the signal is important both for developing and optimizing
the analytic procedures to be applied to data, and for the comparison of the
observed excess with that expected for an SM Higgs with a mass near that
reported.
For present purposes, the latter consideration is particularly salient: in
addition to demonstrating that they have achieved a statistical significance
in excess of 5σ, ATLAS presents a comparison between the excess that they
observe and what one would expect from SM Higgs decays near a mass of 125
GeV (see Figure 1b). Moreover, they do this not only for the combined results,
but also separately for the results from each of the three decay channels that
figure in their discovery. In each case, it is important that the results fit, at
least at a qualitative level, with the expectations from an SM Higgs boson
with mH ∼ 125 GeV, and not so well with the expectations for a Higgs with
mass far from that value. Such an agreement amongst different search modes
would not be likely for data generated by background processes alone.
Another important aspect of the ATLAS argument is their characterization
of the excess that they find. In particular, they estimate the mass of the new
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Fig. 7. Combined search results: (a) The observed (solid) 95% CL limits on the signal
strength as a function of mH and the expectation (dashed) under the background-
only hypothesis. The dark and light shaded bands show the ±1σ and ±2σ uncer-
tainties on the background-only expectation. (b) The observed (solid) local p0 as a
function of mH and the expectation (dashed) for a SM Higgs boson signal hypothe-
sis (µ= 1) at the given mass. (c) The best-fit signal strength µˆ as a function of mH .
The band indicates the approximate 68% CL interval around the fitted value.
582 GeV. The observed 95% CL exclusion regions are 111–122 GeV
and 131–559 GeV. Three mass regions are excluded at 99% CL,
113–114, 117–121 and 132–527 GeV, while the expected exclu-
sion range at 99% CL is 113–532 GeV.
9.2. Observation of an excess of events
An excess of events is observed near mH =126 GeV in the H→
Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ channels, both of which provide fully
reconstructed candidates with high resolution in invariant mass, as
shown in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b). These excesses are confirmed by the
highly sensitive but low-resolution H→ WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channel,
as shown in Fig. 8(c).
The observed local p0 values from the combination of channels,
using the asymptotic approximation, are shown as a function of
mH in Fig. 7(b) for the full mass range and in Fig. 9 for the low
mass range.
The largest local significance for the combination of the 7 and
8 TeV data is found for a SM Higgs boson mass hypothesis of
mH = 126.5 GeV, where it reaches 6.0σ , with an expected value
in the presence of a SM Higgs boson signal at that mass of 4.9σ
(see also Table 7). For the 2012 data alone, the maximum local sig-
nificance for the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H→ γ γ and H→ WW (∗) →
Fig. 8. The observed local p0 as a function of the hypothesised Higgs boson mass
for the (a) H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, (b) H → γ γ and (c) H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels.
The dashed curves show the expected local p0 under the hypothesis of a SM Higgs
boson signal at that mass. Results are shown separately for the
√
s = 7 TeV data
(dark, blue in the web version), the
√
s= 8 TeV data (light, red in the web version),
and their combination (black).
Fig. 9. The observed (solid) local p0 as a function of mH in the low mass range.
The dashed curve shows the expected local p0 under the hypothesis of a SM Higgs
boson signal at that mass with its ±1σ band. The horizontal dashed lines indicate
the p-values corresponding to significances of 1 to 6 σ .
eνµν channels combined is 4.9σ , and occurs at mH = 126.5 GeV
(3.8σ expected).
The significance of the excess is mildly sensitive to uncertain-
ties in the energy resolutions and energy scale systematic uncer-
tainties for photons and electrons; the effect of the muon energy
scale systematic uncertainties is negligible. The presence of these
Fig. 1 Three important ways of evaluating the ATLAS results. In (a) the solid line indicates
95% upper bounds on the value of µ established by the observed data, while the dotted line
indicates the upper bounds that would be expected for background only, with bands show ng
the ±1σ and ±2σ deviations on those background-only upper bounds. In (b) the solid line
gives the local p-value as a function of mH , while the dotted line indicates the expected
p-value based on simulation of the signal, also as function of mH . The best-fit estimate µˆ
of the signal strength as a function of mH is given in (c). (Aad et al. 2012b, 13)
particle that they have observed using the profile likelihood ratio λ(µ,mH).
3
ATLAS presents a plot that shows the 68% and 95% confidence intervals in
3 When confronted with a statistical model with multiple parameters, all but one of which are con-
sidered ‘nuisance’ parameters, the profile likelihood for the parameter of interest is obtained
by maximizing, for every considered value of the parameter of interest, the likelihoods for
the each of the nuisance parameters, and then using the values for the nuisance parameters
thus obtained for estimating the parameter of interest (Cox 1970; Venzon & Moolgavkar
1988).
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the (µ,mH) plane for each of the H → γγ, H → ZZ, and H →WW channels.
The first two form distinct but overlapping contours, while the latter yields no
lower bound on mH (Figure 2). ATLAS notes that the difference between the
maximum likelihood estimates for mH based on the H → ZZ, and H → γγ
channels is sufficiently great that there is only about an 8% probability “for a
single Higgs boson-like particle to produce resonant mass peaks [in those two
channels] separated by more than the observed mass difference” (Aad et al.
2012b).
14 ATLAS Collaboration / Physics Letters B 716 (2012) 1–29
Table 7
Characterisation of the excess in the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H→ γ γ and H→ WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels and the combination of all channels listed in Table 6. The mass value
mmax for which the local significance is maximum, the maximum observed local significance Zl and the expected local significance E(Zl) in the presence of a SM Higgs
boson signal at mmax are given. The best fit value of the signal strength parameter µˆ at mH = 126 GeV is shown with the total uncertainty. The expected and observed mass
ranges excluded at 95% CL (99% CL, indicated by a *) are also given, for the combined
√
s= 7 TeV and √s= 8 TeV data.
Search channel Dataset mmax [GeV] Zl [σ ] E(Zl) [σ ] µˆ(mH = 126 GeV) Expected exclusion [GeV] Observed exclusion [GeV]
H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ 7 TeV 125.0 2.5 1.6 1.4± 1.1
8 TeV 125.5 2.6 2.1 1.1± 0.8
7 & 8 TeV 125.0 3.6 2.7 1.2± 0.6 124–164, 176–500 131–162, 170–460
H→ γ γ 7 TeV 126.0 3.4 1.6 2.2± 0.7
8 TeV 127.0 3.2 1.9 1.5± 0.6
7 & 8 TeV 126.5 4.5 2.5 1.8± 0.5 110–140 112–123, 132–143
H→WW (∗) → ℓνℓν 7 TeV 135.0 1.1 3.4 0.5± 0.6
8 TeV 120.0 3.3 1.0 1.9± 0.7
7 & 8 TeV 125.0 2.8 2.3 1.3± 0.5 124–233 137–261
Combined 7 TeV 126.5 3.6 3.2 1.2± 0.4
8 TeV 126.5 4.9 3.8 1.5± 0.4
7 & 8 TeV 126.5 6.0 4.9 1.4± 0.3 110–582 111–122, 131–559
113–532 (*) 113–114, 117–121, 132–527 (*)
uncertainties, evaluated as described in Ref. [138], reduces the lo-
cal significance to 5.9σ .
The global significance of a local 5.9σ excess anywhere in the
mass range 110–600 GeV is estimated to be approximately 5.1σ ,
increasing to 5.3σ in the range 110–150 GeV, which is approxi-
mately the mass range not excluded at the 99% CL by the LHC com-
bined SM Higgs boson search [139] and the indirect constraints
from the global fit to precision electroweak measurements [12].
9.3. Characterising the excess
The mass of the observed new particle is estimated using the
profile likelihood ratio λ(mH ) for H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ ,
the two channels with the highest mass resolution. The signal
strength is allowed to vary independently in the two channels,
although the result is essentially unchanged when restricted to
the SM hypothesis µ = 1. The leading sources of systematic un-
certainty come from the electron and photon energy scales and
resolutions. The resulting estimate for the mass of the observed
particle is 126.0± 0.4 (stat)± 0.4 (sys) GeV.
The best-fit signal strength µˆ is shown in Fig. 7(c) as a function
of mH . The observed excess corresponds to µˆ= 1.4±0.3 for mH =
126 GeV, which is consistent with the SM Higgs boson hypothesis
µ= 1. A summary of the individual and combined best-fit values
of the strength parameter for a SM Higgs boson mass hypothesis
of 126 GeV is shown in Fig. 10, while more information about the
three main channels is provided in Table 7.
In order to test which values of the strength and mass of a
signal hypothesis are simultaneously consistent with the data, the
profile likelihood ratio λ(µ,mH ) is used. In the presence of a
strong signal, it will produce closed contours around the best-fit
point (µˆ,mˆH ), while in the absence of a signal the contours will
be upper limits on µ for all values of mH .
Asymptotically, the test statistic −2 lnλ(µ,mH ) is distributed as
a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. The resulting 68%
and 95% CL contours for the H → γ γ and H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν
channels are shown in Fig. 11, where the asymptotic approxima-
tions have been validated with ensembles of pseudo-experiments.
Similar contours for the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ channel are also shown
in Fig. 11, although they are only approximate confidence intervals
due to the smaller number of candidates in this channel. These
contours in the (µ,mH ) plane take into account uncertainties in
the energy scale and resolution.
The probability for a single Higgs boson-like particle to pro-
duce resonant mass peaks in the H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ
Fig. 10. Measurements of the signal strength parameter µ for mH = 126 GeV for the
individual channels and their combination.
Fig. 11. Confidence intervals in the (µ,mH ) plane for the H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H →
γ γ , and H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels, including all systematic uncertainties.
The markers indicate the maximum likelihood estimates (µˆ,mˆH ) in the corre-
sponding channels (the maximum likelihood estimates for H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and
H→WW (∗) → ℓνℓν coincide).
channels separated by more than the observed mass difference, al-
lowing the signal strengths to vary independently, is about 8%.
The contributions from the different production modes in the
H → γ γ channel have been studied in order to assess any ten-
sion between the data and the ratios of the production cross
Fig. 2 Confidence intervals in the (µ,mH) plane for the H → γγ, H → ZZ, and H →WW
h nnels. Maximum likelihood estimates (µˆ, mˆH) are marked with ‘+’. (Aad et al. 2012b,
14)
Now, let us consider more closely ATLAS’s calculation of a p-value for their
results. This calculation figures crucially in he way that ATLAS describes the
excess of candidate events beyond background expectations.
As a significance test, the hypothesis tested by ATLAS is framed in terms
of the value of a parameter µ, called the signal strength. This parameter, which
acts as a “scale factor on the total number of events” that the SM predicts for
the Higgs signal, is a function of mH , the (unknown) Higgs mass. It is defined
so that µ = 0 corresponds to the background only hypothesis and µ = 1
corresponds to the hypothesis that an SM Higgs boson as well as background
contributes to the data. This allows µ = 0 to serve as the null hypothesis
subjected to significance testing. (The dependence of µ on mH introduces
complications to the calculation and interpretation of p-values, as discussed
below.)
Testing this null hypothesis requires a choice of test statistic. The test
statistic must be a function of the data X with a known probability distribution
supposing that hypothesis is true (the null distribution), and should be chosen
so that it defines a relevant direction of departure from the null hypothesis. The
test statistic should also be defined such that larger values indicate stronger
evidence of departure, in the relevant direction, from what is expected if the
null hypothesis is true.
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Determining the null distribution in a search for a new particle amounts to
estimating the rate at which background processes will yield events satisfying
the cuts. ATLAS follows a common practice in HEP; they do not use simply
the number of candidate events as their test statistic, but instead the quantity
d(X) = −2ln λ(µ0|X)sup{λ(µ1|X)} (Feldman & Cousins 1998). This statistic uses the
likelihood function λ(µ|X), a function that assumes different values for various
values of µ ∈ M for any particular value of X, such that λ(µ|X) ≡ Pr(X;µ),
where Pr(X;µ) is the probability distribution of X given a value µ ∈ M. The
quantity d(X) is thus defined, for data X, in terms of the likelihood for the null
hypothesis λ(µ0|X) and the least upper bound (supremum) of the likelihoods
of the alternative values of µ, sup{λ(µ1|X)}. These quantities are single-valued
for any given data X, and the test statistic itself will take greater values to
the extent that sup{λ(µ1|X)} exceeds λ(µ0|X).
ATLAS provides a statistical characterization of the extent to which the
number of Higgs candidate events in their data exceeds the expected contri-
bution from background on the basis of the significance test just described.
In fact ATLAS provides multiple statistical characterizations of that excess.
The reason for this is related to the fact that the distribution of the test
statistic under the null hypothesis itself is not uniquely defined. The sensitivity
of the experiment to the presence of decays of Higgs bosons depends in part on
an unknown parameter: the mass of the Higgs boson mH . Assuming that Higgs
bosons do exist, the rate at which they are produced is a decreasing function
of mH . This bears on the definition of the test statistic, in which the likelihood
function for the alternative hypothesis H1 appears in the denominator. Put
differently, mH is a nuisance parameter in the Higgs search, a parameter on
which the sampling distribution for d(X) depends, but that has an unknown
value. Both CMS and ATLAS faced this difficulty, and dealt with it using
somewhat different implementations of the same strategy, which is to begin
by regarding the p-value as a function of the parameter mH . For each value
of mH there is a p-value that is local to it (the local p-value). The next step
is then to report that function (see Figure 1b).4 ATLAS reports that the
maximum significance (minimum local p-value) of 6.0σ is achieved with the
hypothesis of a SM Higgs boson with massmH = 126.5 GeV (taking systematic
uncertainties into account lowers it to 5.9σ). However, the value of mH , being
unknown at the outset, is not in fact set in advance. A similarly significant
result anywhere within the region of Higgs masses to which the experiment was
sensitive would have yielded a similar claim of observation. The probability
that the experiment would report an excess as great as that observed for some
value or other of the Higgs mass, assuming the null hypothesis is true, is
therefore greater than the minimum local p-value. This discrepancy, elsewhere
4 As Cousins states, “for each mass [mH ] there is a p-value for the departure from H0, as if that
mass had been fixed in advance” (Cousins 2014, 33, emphasis in original).
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known by names such as the “multiple trials” or “multiple tests” effect, is
known in HEP as the “Look Elsewhere Effect” (LEE).5
The size of that discrepancy depends on the range of values of mH that one
considers, and just what that range should be is not uniquely defined. Both
ATLAS and CMS reported, along with their local p-values, global p-values,
which report the probability of finding an excess anywhere within a range of
possible values of mH . Both groups, in order to emphasize that these ranges
are “arbitrary or subjective” (Cousins 2014, 33), reported both “wide” and
“narrow” ranges, based on different criteria. Cousins notes, “Some possibilities
were the range of masses for which the SM Higgs boson [had] not previously
been ruled out at high confidence; the range of masses for which the experiment
is capable of observing the SM Higgs boson; or the range of masses for which
sufficient data had been acquired to search for any new boson. The experiments
made different choices” (ibid.). They certainly did. The range reported by
ATLAS as “narrow” runs from 110 to 150 GeV (with a significance of 5.3σ),
while the range reported by CMS as “wide” is 110–145 GeV (with a significance
of 4.5σ). Reporting these global significance values serves as a kind of check
on the sensitivity of the statistical significance to the LEE, and to fulfill that
purpose the end points of the ranges used need not be uniformly determined.
The kind of sensitivity analysis conveyed by the reporting of multiple global
p-values addresses uncertainty about how precisely to model the experiment
that has been performed. For any particular model, the p-value is perfectly
well-defined, but a number of different models are plausible. The task is to
show that the p-value does not depend strongly on just which of those plausible
models is chosen (Staley 2002). Moreover, the reporting of multiple ranges (as
well as showing how the local p-value varies with mH) serves an important
communicative function, enabling the reader of the experimental report to
consider for herself the sensitivity of the results to different ways of thinking
about the experimental search. Insofar as different readers might have interests
and beliefs that lead them to consider different ranges to be relevant, they
might be interested in different “elsewheres.”6
On the view here advanced, the p-value plays an important argumentative
role in establishing the existence of a new boson. What enables it to play this
role is that it quantifies one dimension of a multi-dimensional evaluation of the
evidence supporting that claim: It is important, for the purpose of cogently
arguing for their claim, that ATLAS be able to establish that they have taken
sufficient care to rule out, on a reasonable basis, the possibility of being misled
by a stochastic fluctuation in the background. The calculation of a p-value
addresses that need. Other dimensions of ATLAS’s assessment of the evidence
that are essential to their experimental argument include the (1) distribution
of the candidate events across different decay modes, (2) the comparison of
the data with theoretical expectations for a Higgs boson with a mass in the
5 For a discussion of the LEE in the Higgs search from a Bayesian standpoint, see (Dawid 2015b,
2015a).
6 I have adopted this felicitous expression from a comment by a referee.
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range indicated by the data, (3) the ability to arrive at an estimated mass for
the candidate decay events, and (4) the comparison of the estimated mass for
different decay channels.
3 Warrant for significance testing
What makes the warrant for significance testing in HEP pragmatic can best be
seen by contrast. One might suppose that the choice of a probabilistic frame-
work for data analysis should be made on the basis of whether the framework
yields verdicts regarding the credibility of hypotheses that align with our pre-
theoretical views about when we have good grounds for — i.e., are epistem-
ically justified in — believing a hypothesis. When the warrant for a choice
of probabilistic framework has this character, we might call the warrant epis-
temic. The warrant here discussed differs in that its relationship to matters of
belief is indirect.
My argument assumes that the ATLAS and CMS collaborations aim (col-
lectively) not (only) to form beliefs about scientific subjects, but to contribute
to the production of scientific knowledge. This assumption attributes to these
groups a fundamental aim that is simultaneously epistemic (insofar as it con-
cerns knowledge) and pragmatic (insofar as it concerns a productive activity
undertaken collectively).
That productive activity involves, among other things, the practical tasks
of discovery and argumentation. The warrant for the use of significance testing
in HEP is pragmatic in the sense that significance testing is useful for the pur-
suit of these practical tasks. That discovery, in particular, should be thought
of as practical requires some argument, which I now undertake.
The practical nature of these tasks might best be appreciated by viewing
them in light of three questions, the answers to which bear on the manner in
which experimental data will be analyzed: (1) What are the learning goals of
the experiment? (2) What are the possible errors that must be confronted?
and (3) What are the foreseeable practical consequences of those errors or
their absence, including those that bear on further and related inquiries?
As these three questions hold the key to the pragmatic warranting of AT-
LAS’s statistical practices, it is worth taking them in turn.
(1) What are the learning goals of the experiment? Obviously, ATLAS
aimed to answer the question “Does the Higgs boson exist?” But they sought
to do more than this. They sought to enable themselves to base their answer to
that question on their own experimental data, and to do so in such a way that
providing a positive answer would constitute a discovery. Discovery involves
more than belief. As Dawid has noted (Dawid 2015b, 2015a), many physicists,
perhaps most, already thought themselves well warranted in assigning a high
degree of belief to the Higgs hypothesis. ATLAS sought either to discover the
Higgs boson (if it exists) or to rule it out (if it does not). Moreover, they
sought to answer the Higgs question in a way that would enable them to make
a persuasive argument to their intended audience in support of the answer at
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which they arrived and to support any discovery claim that might accompany
that answer. (It deserves notice here that, especially in the context of a large
collaboration like ATLAS, this argumentation aim is directed both externally
and internally. The former is based on the need to present a cogent case for
discovery to others, the latter is based on the need for establishing consensus
within the group.)
To make a discovery claim is not merely to report a high degree of be-
lief in a hypothesis that asserts the existence of some new phenomenon, but
to declare oneself in possession of data or evidence that provides significant
new support for that hypothesis. Such new support cannot be based on an
experimental test with results that are just what one would expect if the phe-
nomenon in question did not exist.7 To discover a new phenomenon requires
a discrepancy between the experimental outcome in question and what one
would expect in the absence of that phenomenon. An argument in support of
such a discovery must accordingly establish the existence of such a discrep-
ancy. Significance testing is thus useful for the purpose of discovery because
it requires experimenters to (1) construct a model on the basis of which they
may estimate what one should expect in the absence of the phenomenon in
question, and (2) quantify the discrepancy (in a statistical sense) between that
expectation and the actual experimental outcome, while also (3) confronting
the question of the liability of their testing procedure to generate erroneous
conclusions from that discrepancy. These same features make it useful for ar-
gumentative purposes because the explicit consideration of these three factors
makes them available for deployment in an argument that seeks to establish
that a discovery has been made.
(2) What are the possible errors that must be confronted? The third of the
three features of significance testing just mentioned — the liability of a test
to error — is clearly addressed in significance testing at least in the sense of
quantifying the probability of a Type I error of rejecting the null hypothesis,
supposing it is true. Although the probability of a Type II error is not explicitly
calculated in the significance test procedure, the physicists searching for the
Higgs were clearly motivated to avoid the problem of having a high probability
of failing to reject the null hypothesis, assuming it to be false. The choice of
the likelihood ratio as a test statistic itself draws its justification from the
desirable Type II error probabilities of tests based on the likelihood ratio.
Another way in which the probability of a Type II error could be made too
high would be by setting the discovery threshold for significance too high (as
discussed in the next section).
Thinking of the possible errors simply as accepting the existence of the
Higgs when only background processes are present and failing to accept the
Higgs hypothesis when the Higgs is present provides us with only the coarsest-
grained description of the landscape of errors surveyed by the ATLAS physi-
cists. The complexity of that landscape reflects the complexity of the analytic
7 The principle invoked here is similar to what Mayo and Spanos call the “weak severity principle”
(Mayo & Spanos 2009, 21).
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procedures ATLAS brought to bear on their data. For the purpose of simply
assessing the warrant for ATLAS’s reliance on significance testing it will have
to suffice that these two primary ways of going wrong are the ultimate source
of concern, and all of the more fine-grained possibilities of error become rel-
evant precisely because of their potential to lead to one or the other of these
two main errors.
At this point, however, it is important to address a concern about frequen-
tist methods such as significance testing.8 Phrases like “the probability of com-
mitting an error” are ambiguous between two distinct quantities, only one of
which is addressed, or even considered legitimate, in frequentist statistics. The
first quantity, for the outcome of a significance test, is Pr(d(X) ≥ d(x0);H0),
which is the probability of obtaining a value for the test statistic that is at
least as great as that obtained from the observed data, assuming the null hy-
pothesis is true. This, of course, is simply the p-value. The second quantity
that we might regard as “the probability of committing an error” in a test of
a null hypothesis is Pr(d(X) ≥ d(x0)∧H0). For frequentists the latter proba-
bility is illegitimate because it requires the determination of a probability for
the null hypothesis itself. Thus, a warrant for relying on significance testing
cannot rest simply on demonstrating that it addresses a concern with limiting
the probability of erroneously rejecting the null, since it only relates to one of
the two ways of conceiving that error.
In response to this point, recall that I have emphasized the use of the sig-
nificance test as playing an important argumentative role in supporting AT-
LAS’s claim to have discovered a new Higgs-like boson. That role, specifically,
is to establish the existence of a sufficient statistical discrepancy between the
background hypothesis and the excess of candidate Higgs decays in the data.
Although the LEE introduces what some might regard as an ambiguity in the
definition of the p-value for the Higgs results, the sensitivity analysis reported
via the calculation of global p-values lends credibility to the effectiveness of the
p-value as a measure of statistical discrepancy by showing it to depend only
very weakly on the precise model of the experiment performed. The p-value
remains a useful device for its argumentative purpose.
The probability Pr(d(X) ≥ d(x0)∧H0) would not be suitable for this same
purpose, for two reasons.
First, its calculation would require determining a value for the prior prob-
ability Pr(H0). The difficulty here is not that there is no way to do this, but
that there are too many ways to do it, from the ‘reference priors’ of objective
Bayesians to elicitation procedures aimed at discovering the personal proba-
bilities of experts. Of course, one could simply give Pr(d(X) ≥ d(x0) ∧ H0)
as a function of Pr(H0) and let the reader choose her own prior probabil-
ity. Indeed, such a report could be useful, but were experimentalists to limit
themselves to reporting only this, they would be abandoning one of their own
central aims, radically revising the task of reporting the outcome of an exper-
iment. Bayesians commonly criticize p-values on the grounds that “what we
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue.
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really want to know” is not the probability of getting such-and-such a result
assuming that the null hypothesis is true but the probability, in light of the
data, that the null (or alternative) hypothesis is actually false (or true). But
even if it is true that this is “what we really want to know,” it does not follow
that we should abandon significance testing for Bayesian statistics. Bayesian
analyses cannot deliver this quantity either. Instead, they can only tell us what
posterior probability we would arrive at, were we to begin with any particular
prior probability.
Second, even were it possible to determine a unique value for Pr(d(X) ≥
d(x0) ∧ H0) (or, as a Bayesian would prefer, the function Pr(X|H0)Pr(H0),
evaluated at X = x0), it would still not serve the argumentative function
played by p-values. Because it is equal to the product of the p-value (inter-
preted now as a conditional probability) and the prior probability of H0, the
fact that this number is low would not by itself indicate a statistical discrep-
ancy between H0 and the results of the test, since such a low number could
simply reflect a low value for the prior probability. The part of the calculation
relevant for argumentative purposes would remain the p-value.
ATLAS’s choice of a methodology of significance testing is warranted in
light of their aims and in light of the kinds of errors they sought to avoid. They
sought to be able to make a clear and compelling case, for a somewhat diverse
audience, either for or against the existence of the Higgs, while limiting the
probability of doing so erroneously. Significance testing alone is not sufficient
for this aim, but it can contribute to the pursuit of it, by providing evidence
regarding the compatibility of the data with the background-only hypothesis.
To clarify the contrast between the approach taken here and an epistemic
approach, consider an example of the latter. Richard Dawid’s recent discus-
sions of the Higgs discovery (Dawid 2015b, 2015a) are noteworthy for their
sensitivity to many of the issues that have been raised in this essay. Dawid
notes the considerable confidence that many physicists had in the Higgs hy-
pothesis prior to the July 2012 announcements, and raises the question whether
this confidence should make a difference to the way in which the experimental
data are analyzed (particularly regarding the Look Elsewhere Effect (LEE))
and the standards of discovery that should be applied.
Dawid distinguishes two positions. The experimentalist’s position main-
tains that prior confidence in the Higgs hypothesis does not warrant treating
the data differently than one would in other experimental searches for new
phenomena, and that the same standards of discovery should be applied. The
theoretician’s position claims that prior confidence in the Higgs hypothesis is
well warranted and thus can and should be taken into account in the treatment
of experimental data. This difference of opinion Dawid traces to a difference of
priorities: the experimentalist’s position “has the priority to defend the purity
of the process of data analysis by keeping it free of theoretical reasoning that
is about to be tested by those very data” while the theoretician’s position “has
the priority to be frank about our actual beliefs with respect to the hypothesis
in question” (Dawid 2015b, 83).
Pragmatic Warrant for Frequentist Practice 13
In his (2015b), Dawid employs the theorist’s position to defend a partially
Bayesian approach to the Higgs data. In effect, he argues that Bayesian consid-
erations of the plausibility of the Higgs hypothesis in light of both theoretical
considerations and previous experimental results warrant a limitation of the
LEE that obviates the need for a strict adherence to a 5σ standard of dis-
covery. Dawid’s proposal retains the use of significance testing, insofar as the
criterion of discovery still refers to the local p-value as the relevant quantity
(as opposed to the reporting of a posterior probability as called for in a fully
Bayesian approach). The standard applied to that quantity, however, is sub-
ject to modification based on Bayesian considerations of the prior probabilities
of the relevant hypotheses.
The syncretism of Dawid’s approach resembles that advocated here in that
it avoids allowing rigid adherence to a single probabilistic framework to dom-
inate decisions about how best to analyze data, but his syncretism is not
grounded in pragmatism in the same sense as here proposed. Dawid instead
advocates a resolutely Bayesian epistemic framework: “Any coherent charac-
terization of the transition from a phase of non-empirical theory confirmation
to the discovery of corresponding particles must be based on a Bayesian over-
all perspective as well, which speaks in favour of an epistemically Bayesian
embedding of frequentist data analysis” (Dawid 2015a, 17).
Dawid’s allowance of frequentist methods arises from a deference to physi-
cists’ preference for objectivity: completely replacing frequentist statistical
analysis of data with a completely Bayesian approach would “permit that a
rigid quantitative statistical analysis where the numerical input is well deter-
mined by the empirical data gets adulterated by probability assessments that
are vague and subjective. It would put guessing priors on the same footing
as rigid and quantitative experimental testing,” whereas retaining a frequen-
tist approach to data analysis “avoids messing with the objective character of
statistical data analysis itself” (Dawid 2015b, 92).
Dawid is certainly correct to point to the value of objectivity as a considera-
tion that physicists cite in favor of frequentist statistics and against full-fledged
Bayesianism, but leaves unaddressed the question of when and how objectivity
matters to the decisions scientists must make about how to analyze their data.
According to the view advanced here, the value of significance testing rests
not merely on a preference for objectivity, but on its suitability for certain
practical tasks of experimental HEP. It seems likely that the value of objectiv-
ity in significance calculations itself rests at least in part on the argumentative
effectiveness of ways of characterizing the data that depend as little as possible
on propositions that are subject to differences of opinion.
4 The 5σ standard
3) What are the foreseeable practical consequences of those errors or their ab-
sence, including those that bear on further and related inquiries? Knowing
what would constitute an error is not the same as knowing what will happen
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once an error is committed. This question receives no explicit treatment in
ATLAS’s published Higgs results. This, however, does not mean that consid-
eration of it played no identifiable role in their deliberations over the statistical
assessment of their data. On the contrary, the consequences of erroneously an-
nouncing a discovery of the Higgs played an important role in their reliance
on what many regarded as an extremely strict standard of significance: the
“5σ” rule previously mentioned. As this may constitute the clearest instance
of pragmatic thinking in this episode, this point deserves its own discussion.
Although the requirement that discovery claims in HEP be premised on
statistical excesses that are significant at a level of 5σ has assumed the status
of tradition within the HEP community,9 it has no official institutional codifi-
cation and physicists will deny that its normative force is absolute. According
to Joe Incandela, who was spokesperson for CMS at the time of the July 2012
announcements, “the 5 sigma standard is generally misunderstood outside the
field. We do not take 5 sigma as absolutely necessary nor do we assume all 5
sigma results to be correct” (personal communication). Similarly, CMS mem-
ber Robert Cousins comments, “I do not believe that experienced physicists
have such an automatic response to a p-value, but it may be that some people
in the field may take the fixed threshold more seriously than is warranted”
(Cousins 2014, 30). Meanwhile, some physicists have called for reform of the
5σ standard. Louis Lyons, for example, has called for a “more nuanced crite-
rion” that would be more or less demanding for a variety of possible future
discoveries, based on four criteria: the presence of an LEE, the magnitude
of systematic uncertainties, the impact of the discovery, and the “degree of
surprise” (also called the “subconscious Bayes’ factor”) (Lyons 2013).
Lyons’ criteria cohere well with responses that Tony O’Hagan received
from physicists to his query regarding the rationale for the 5σ criterion, men-
tioned in §1. Acknowledging the statistical (and pragmatic) inappropriate-
ness of an ironclad significance threshold for discovery claims, these responses
(apart from a minority of Bayesian physicists calling for the abandonment of
significance testing altogether) indicated an acceptance of 5σ as an appropri-
ate standard for the Higgs search itself. (In Lyons’ enumeration of varying
significance standards from 3 to >8 standard deviations for fourteen different
HEP searches, the standard for the Higgs search remains at 5σ.) Prominent
among the considerations cited are the LEE10 and systematic uncertainty, or
more generically, to quote O’Hagan’s summary, the fact that “so much can
go wrong that it makes sense to guard against false positives caused by er-
9 Allan Franklin has documented the emergence of the 5σ standard in HEP (Franklin 2013). Ac-
cording to Franklin’s narrative, the standard has only assumed the weight that it does carry
rather recently, around the time of the discovery of the top quark, for which an initial paper
by CDF in 1994 claimed only “evidence,” with a significance corresponding to 2.8σ for a
Gaussian distribution (Abe et al. 1994). Later papers by CDF and D0 claimed the top’s
“observation” on the basis of 5.0σ and 4.6σ, respectively (Abe et al. 1995; Abachi et al.
1995; Staley 2004).
10 As noted above, however, Dawid (2015b) uses Bayesian considerations to argue that the LEE is
not as significant a problem for the Higgs search as others have suggested, and therefore
application of the stringent 5σ standard is unjustified.
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rors in underlying assumptions, pre-processing, experimental controls, etc.”
(O’Hagan 2012, 5).
The problems of the LEE and systematic uncertainties constitute obstacles
toward taking the calculated local significance seriously as an accurate mea-
sure of what it purports to be: the probability of observing an excess as great
as or greater than that observed, assuming that only background processes are
present. They leave unaddressed the further questions of why the standard for
discovery should be a very demanding one in the first place (why is 3σ not
good enough?) and why it should not be even more demanding (why would 8σ
not be even better?). Dawid argues that Lyons’ “subconscious Bayes’ factor”
is relevant to these questions (Dawid 2015b, 2015a). Here I consider how the
criterion of impact bears on them. The impact of the outcome of the Higgs
search can be illuminated by addressing question (3): What are the foresee-
able practical consequences of the possible errors or their absence? Although
answers to this question do not determine univocally a precise standard that
must be applied, they will illuminate the reasons that shaped the terrain in
which the decision was made.11
The pragmatic perspective requires us to acknowledge that the outcome of
an inference is not only an event in an abstract realm of ideas, but is a decision
with practical consequences. As C. West Churchman notes,
In pragmatic methodology, every scientific hypothesis is considered to
be a possible course of action for accomplishing a certain end, or set of
ends. Pragmatically speaking, an inability to say what one intends to
do as a result of accepting one out of a set of alternative hypotheses,
is an inability to state the hypotheses themselves in adequate terms.
(Churchman 1948, 259)
It is commonly held that inference and decision are distinct kinds of problems
calling for distinct analytic frameworks.12 The position here advocated does
not dispute that there is an important distinction between treating a problem
as a matter of inference and as a matter of decision. Nor should one neglect
the value of analyzing the data as though one were faced with a strictly in-
ferential question. Rather, the point emphasized by Churchman is that, as
regards the practice of engaging in scientific research, a purely inferential per-
spective is incomplete. The analysis of data makes a difference to the state
of scientific knowledge only via the decisions of researchers regarding what to
report on the basis of that analysis, how to report it, and when to report it.
Such decisions cannot be made without some consideration of their potential
11 Those familiar with the “argument from inductive risk” that seeks to establish a role for value
judgments in core tasks of scientific reasoning (Churchman 1948; Douglas 2009; Rudner
1953) will note its resemblance to the point being here pursued. See (Staley 2016) for further
discussion of inductive risk in the context of the Higgs search.
12 Exactly which framework is appropriate for which problem remains a matter of dispute. Statistical
Methods in Experimental Physics, a widely used text, emphasizes (in both of its two editions)
frequentist techniques for the analysis of data, and introduces Bayesian statistics as an
approach to decision problems (alongside frequentist methods) (Eadie, Dryard, James, Roos,
& Sadoulet 1971; James 2006).
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consequences, for good or ill. It may be that in many cases the consequences
are so transparent or so inconsequential that no explicit discussion of them
is called for. For a coherent philosophical understanding of the scientific pro-
cess, acknowledgement of the role and import of such decisions is essential
nonetheless.
In other words, even if scientists individually engage in what Isaac Levi
calls “attempts to seek the truth and nothing but the truth” (Levi 1962),
the conduct of experimental inquiry is not only a matter of the pursuit of
true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones. Because science is an essentially
social undertaking, it necessarily involves decisions about how to carry out
argumentative and communicative tasks, and the statistical analysis of data is
an element of such tasks. It may make perfect sense to attribute to ATLAS and
CMS the aims of accepting true propositions and rejecting false ones, but the
successful pursuit of these aims is not sufficient for science, which requires also
that significant truths be communicated clearly and supported with cogent
argumentation. Communication and argumentation are practical tasks, albeit
ones with potentially significant epistemic import (Staley 2016).
The decisions implicated in the discovery of a new boson in July 2012
took place at various levels and were distributed across various actors. In
addition to all of the intra-group decisions regarding analysis, discussion, and
argumentation, the groups as a whole had to reach a decision to go forward
with the submission of papers declaring that a new boson had been “observed.”
Beyond those decisions lay the decision of the lab director, Rolf Heuer, who
made the actual announcement and whose reasoning drew upon the fact that
both groups had independently accumulated results with a 5σ significance.
We can place the consequences of these decisions into two categories: those
that pertain directly to the logical argumentation of future physics inquiries,
and those that pertain indirectly to the aims of ATLAS, CMS, and the HEP
community more broadly.
Regarding the first category, accepting the existence of a new boson amounts
to a commitment to adopt statements entailing the existence of such a particle
as premises in the pursuit of further inquiries. This commitment has its most
obvious salience for the continued work of ATLAS and CMS themselves, as
their analytic tasks turn from the aim of producing exclusion plots towards the
aim of measuring the properties of the newly discovered particle and probing
further implications of the Higgs hypothesis to fix more securely the theoret-
ical interpretation of their finding. For other physicists working on SM and
Beyond-SM problems, the announcement by ATLAS and CMS change the
logical terrain. Although each investigator must decide (as an individual or
as a member of a working group) whether the evidence offered by the two
CERN groups suffices to warrant agreement with their discovery claims, the
burden now lies on those who would decline those claims to explain their dis-
sent. These considerations contribute to our understanding of the 5σ standard
for the Higgs search by highlighting the importance, for the pursuit of physics
inquiries within ATLAS and CMS as well as beyond, of guarding against an
erroneous discovery claim, while also pointing towards the tremendous value of
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that discovery claim, as it enables the pursuit of new inquiries that previously
had to wait offstage.
The second category of consequences must be regarded as somewhat more
speculative, but various statements of physicists involved in the Higgs search
suggest some relevant considerations. CMS’s published paper declares in its
introduction that “The discovery or exclusion of the SM Higgs is one of the pri-
mary scientific goals of the Large Hadron Collider” (Chatrchyan et al. 2012b,
30). Given the great expense of building the LHC and operating the CMS and
ATLAS experimental programs, it is not surprising that success at achieving
this goal was highly valued. The much-anticipated discovery claims themselves
were not merely attended by submitting papers for publication, but by a kind
of scientific showmanship including a presentation to the press that was broad-
cast via the internet worldwide and featured prominently among the news of
the day. To get things wrong would have been tremendously embarrassing.
Although one cannot be certain of the consequences of such an error, it is
not unreasonable to imagine them including even a political dimension with
negative consequences for the funding of HEP.
One respondent to O’Hagan’s query communicates vividly the personal
nature of such considerations: “In fact, we do have high standards because
in our view we are trying to arrive at ‘true’ statements about the world in
the pragmatic sense that these statements yield predictions that turn out
to be correct. Given that the search for the Higgs took some 45 years, tens
of thousands of scientists and engineers, billions of dollars, not to mention
numerous divorces, huge amounts of sleep deprivation, tens of thousands of
bad airline meals, etc., etc., we want to be sure as is humanly possible that
this is real” (O’Hagan 2012, 5).
In addition to concerns about the amount of effort and expense that had
gone into the search for the Higgs and its importance to the scientific project
of the LHC, a broader sense of responsibility toward the public perception
of science in general may have played a role in the cautious attitude toward
any discovery announcement. According to CMS member Robert Cousins,
the intense public spotlight that the LHC had felt since 2008 made it clear
that there was an opportunity to try to show science of very high quality
to the general public, in an environment where there was public skepticism
about some scientific claims. Certainly making a discovery announcement that
subsequently turned out to be erroneous carried a very high cost, and could
only contribute to such skepticism (personal communication).
One might at this point object that the warrant I have been discussing
is not really pragmatic, but ultimately, or at least primarily, epistemic. The
aims that are concerned directly with inquiry are clearly concerned with the
pursuit of knowledge. Even concerns about the consequences of error for the
status and funding of HEP or for the public perception of science are really
concerned with sustaining the scientific pursuit of knowledge.
This objection, however, misunderstands the pragmatic perspective on in-
quiry here proposed. The broad sense of ‘practical’ that I have invoked should
be understood to include those actions that are part of the scientific pur-
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suit of knowledge. This pragmatic perspective on inquiry highlights the fact
that inquiry is not directed at truth alone, but at the ability to communi-
cate and argue on behalf of propositions that answer questions that are part
of an investigation undertaken deliberately, systematically, and collectively.
The epistemic is shot through with the pragmatic. Scientists use procedures
that are warranted not because they guarantee the epistemic warrant of the
propositions thus advanced (which always remains an empirical question to
be decided on a case-by-case basis), but because of their strategic value in
the pursuit of more specific aims (in this I am in agreement with the view
recently advanced by Peter Achinstein (2013)). In the present example, the
aim I have been discussing is the determination of a statistical discrepancy
between the data and the null hypothesis, for the purpose of providing an
important premise in arguing for a discovery claim in HEP, and the strategi-
cally valuable rule may be formulated as ‘report a p-value and and accept the
discovery claim only if the significance exceeds the 5σ level.’
Taking the pragmatic perspective allows us to see that considerations re-
garding the consequences of an inference are not extraneous to the scientific
process, but rather help to clarify it. A clear articulation of the meaning of
an inference will bring to light its practical dimension, thus helping us to
understand the evidential standards that have been brought to bear on it –
standards that might otherwise seem arbitrary or mysterious.
5 An objection
My argument for the pragmatic warrant of significance testing in HEP has em-
phasized the importance, for argumentation purposes, of establishing a statis-
tical discrepancy between the background hypothesis and the observed excess
of Higgs candidates, and the suitability of calculating a p-value for doing so.
This justification would clearly be circular, were the perceived importance of
this argumentative task itself an artifact of the adoption of the methodology
of significance testing.
I contend in response that we have good reason to believe that the im-
portance, in arguing for a discovery claim in HEP, of establishing a statistical
discrepancy between the null hypothesis and the observed data is logically
prior to the choice of statistical methodology.
I have already cited a principle that supports this claim of logical priority:
Discovery requires data or evidence that provides significant new support for
the existence of a new phenomenon, and that requires, in turn, that such data
yield a discrepancy with what one would expect if the phenomenon in question
did not exist. A compelling argument to support the experimental discovery
of a new phenomenon should establish the existence of such a discrepancy.
Adherence to this guiding principle is reflected in the history of particle
physics experimentation, prior to the widespread adoption of a significance
testing methodology. Consider, for example, Carl Anderson’s 1933 discovery
of the positron. Anderson begins his paper announcing this discovery with
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Fig. 3 A cloud chamber photograph of a track left by a positron. The particle enters
from below and passes through a 6mm lead plate across the center. The subsequent loss
of momentum results in the greater curvature of the track in the upper region. (Anderson
1933, 492)
discussion of a single photograph from his cloud chamber. In the center of this
photograph (see Figure 3) one can see the image of the lead plate that cuts
across the center of the cloud chamber, with a track that seems to pass through
the lead plate. The curvature of the track is attributable to the action of a mag-
netic field on a charged particle. This image, he argues, can only be interpreted
as a “particle carrying a positive charge but having a mass of the same order of
magnitude as that normally possessed by a free negative electron” (Anderson
1933, 491). This interpretation, he argues, is “inevitable.” Anderson’s argu-
mentation is heterogeneous: some arguments target alternative explanations
as being untenable or implausible at the outset; other arguments aim to estab-
lish, in an informal way, a statistical incompatibility between an alternative
explanation and particular features of the photograph. He compares those fea-
tures with expectations derived from two possible alternative interpretations
based on the only charged particles known at the time: the negatively charged
electron and the proton:
The change of curvature due to loss of energy in the lead plate indicates that
the particle was traveling from the bottom of the cloud chamber to the top.
Based on the known orientation of the magnetic field, Anderson concludes that
the particle has a positive charge. Perhaps it is a proton? Anderson determines
the energy such a proton would have from the curvature of the track. The total
range in air of a proton with that energy is an order of magnitude smaller than
measured length of the track in the chamber. The observed feature is, thus,
incompatible with the expectation from the proton hypothesis.
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Anderson then turns to the consideration of a negative electron interpre-
tation of the track. He considers two scenarios: (1) two negative electrons just
happened independently to line up so as to produce the appearance of a single
particle passing through the lead plate; (2) a single negative electron, traveling
from the top of the chamber to the bottom, made the track. Anderson rules
out scenario (2) as implausible, since it would require the electron in question
to gain 40 million electron volts from passing through 6 mm of lead.
Anderson’s only explicit (though still informal) reference to probability
comes in his argument against the negative electron scenario (1): “This as-
sumption was dismissed on a probability basis, since a sharp track of this
order of curvature under the experimental conditions prevailing occurred in
the chamber only once in some 500 exposures, and since there was practically
no chance at all that two such tracks should line up in this way” (ibid.). (An-
derson had a total of 1300 photographs.) Here Anderson argues that under
the assumption that only negatively charged electrons are involved in produc-
ing the track, the probability of an image such as that in Figure 3 is highly
improbable. He does not actually calculate that probability. From the “once
in 500” number that he does cite, we might estimate the probability of finding
two such tracks in the same photograph as 4× 10−6. Adding the requirement
that the two tracks line up exactly so as to produce the appearance of a single
particle passing through the lead plate presumably reduces the probability to
a considerably smaller value, thus justifying Anderson’s “practically no chance
at all” claim.13
The argument just summarized is central to Anderson’s claim to have dis-
covered the positron. He clearly judged it important to establish the incom-
patibility of the data he had collected with the denial of the hypothesis for
which he claimed support. Just as clearly, this judgment was not motivated
to some prior commitment to the methodology of significance testing. Fisher’s
Statistical Methods for Research Workers had only been published eight years
previously (Fisher 1925), and (as Allan Franklin documents in his 2013) physi-
cists would not take up the systematic use of significance calculations until
some time later.
Of course, Anderson’s paper is only one example, and does not suffice on its
own to establish that particle physics argumentation in general abides by the
principle that supporting discovery claims requires establishing the statistical
incompatibility of data with the background hypothesis. A more thorough his-
torical argument to this effect would require a more lengthy discussion than
can here be afforded. Nonetheless, I contend that the argumentation in Ander-
son’s paper establishes the plausibility of my historical claim. Moreover, the
papers discussed in (Franklin 2013) provide an excellent resource for finding
further supporting evidence.
13 Anderson also discusses the possibility that an undetected photon struck a nucleus in the lead plate,
knocking out two particles in opposite directions. This, however, does not really count as
an alternative to the claim of a positively charged electron, since (from considerations of
curvature and direction) one of the particles knocked out of the lead plate would have to be
just such a positively charged, low-mass particle.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper has argued that pragmatism helps us to understand how the sta-
tistical methodology of HEP is warranted. Naturally, another philosophical
framework that could warrant the use of such frequentist statistical methods
would be statistical frequentism itself. Indeed, one could regard frequentism
and pragmatism as compatible. Neyman and Pearson themselves sometimes
seem to articulate ideas that at least seem compatible with pragmatism, and
the influential early pragmatist C. S. Peirce himself articulated a resolutely
frequentist anticipation of the Neyman-Pearson approach (Peirce 1883).
However, if we understand frequentism either as the (strong) position that
the only probability statements that are meaningful are those involving proba-
bilities as relative frequencies or as the (weaker) position that only probabilities
understood as relative frequencies are useful in the statistical analysis of data,
then we have to regard as problematic another aspect of HEP statistical prac-
tice, which is its incorporation of Bayesian techniques in, typically, supporting
roles in the analysis of data. An example of this concerns a commonly used
technique for incorporating systematic uncertainties, such as when an estimate
of a physical quantity requires assigning a value to another, auxiliary, physical
quantity that is imperfectly known. One solution to this problem involves as-
signing a probability distribution to the auxiliary quantity, in effect dispersing
the estimated quantity across a broader range of values than one would obtain
from assigning a fixed point value to the auxiliary quantity (Cousins & High-
land 1992). The probability distribution assigned to the auxiliary quantity
cannot be given a frequentist interpretation.
In cases such as these, pragmatism seems to trump frequentism. The com-
mitment to frequentist statistics apparently does not rest on a belief that only
statements about frequency probabilities are meaningful or useful. Although a
careful discussion of such methods for dealing with systematic uncertainties is
a subject for another paper, pragmatism points us toward the kinds of consid-
erations that would be relevant to understanding such an apparent statistical
eclecticism. For example: What is the epistemological problem to be solved?
What are the argumentation requirements for a satisfactory solution to this
kind of problem? How can solutions to this kind of problem be related to the
results of work undertaken on connected scientific problems?
The argument of this paper has focused on the particular case of the use
of p-values in the argument for the discovery of a new Higgs-like boson based
on the Higgs search results at ATLAS and CMS. In spite of the many crit-
icisms of p-values, the LHC physicists’ use of them was warranted because
they employed significance testing for the specific purpose of providing ev-
idence relevant to the multi-dimensional assessment of the hypothesis that
their excess of Higgs candidates was due to a stochastic fluctuation of non-
Higgs background processes. Their use of significance testing was tailored to
specific inferential and argumentative aims, in light of explicit consideration
of the possible errors that could be made in drawing an inference, and with at
least implicit attention to the consequences of such errors, both for immediate
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matters of related scientific inquiries and for broader matters related to the
place of HEP and science in society.
I have argued here that considerations of the consequences of possible errors
of inference played an important (though not exclusive) role in the determi-
nation of standards of evidence for purposes of announcing a discovery based
on the Higgs search results at LHC. Discussions of the practical consequences
of accepting a hypothesis are part of the pragmatic clarification of an infer-
ence. Yet current norms governing scientific communication tend to force such
discussions into informal, background contexts, so that the resulting decisions
appear to the public as they were reported in the press following the Higgs
announcement of July 2012: as a “gold standard” or as a “strict notion of
scientific certainty” the status of which is simply to be taken for granted.14
Although I would not propose that every positive scientific claim must be ac-
companied by a detailed discussion of the deliberations that guided the choice
of evidential standard that was applied to that claim, I do think that a more
complete execution of the program of pragmatic clarification should include a
more systematic expectation that scientists in fields such as HEP should ad-
dress explicitly and thoroughly the considerations – including those regarding
potential consequence of errors – that guide such decisions.
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